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Peaceful elections pave way 
for independence 
In East Timor's first free elections the 
Revolutionary Front for the 
Independence of East Timor (Fretilin) 
swept into power, winning 55 of the 
88 seats in the Constituent Assembly. 
Women candidates from various 
parties did better than expected, 
winning 24 seats. The vote took place 
on 30 August, two years to the day 
after the historic 'Popular Consultation' 
when the East Timorese opted to 
separate from Indonesia. More than 91 
per cent of registered voters turned 
out in the latest poll, which was 
overwhelmingly peaceful. 
The Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party gained half a dozen seats each. A Fretilin splinter group, 
the Timorese Social Democratic Association 
(ASDD, led by one of Fretilin's founders, 
also did well. 
The Special Representative of the United 
Nations Secretary General has appointed a 
cabinet (see box on page 2). Prime Minister 
Mari Alkatiri will now oversee tricky 
negotiations on the constitution, which 
must be drafted by the end of the year in 
preparation for Independence Day, which 
has been set for 20 May 2002. The UN 
Security Council met in late October to 
finalise its plans for slimming down the UN 
administration in East Timor. 
High on the agenda for non-
governmental organisations and human 
rights activists, both East Timorese and 
international, is the quest for justice. The 
UN administration has failed to bring to 
Election rally, August 2001 
justice the top military perpetrators of the 
crimes against humanity committed by 
Indonesia in 1999 and during the 25-year 
occupation of East Timor. Timor Link has 
devoted much space to this debate in the 
past two years. For another perspective on 
the need for an international tribunal see 
the article by Jon Cina on page 6. 
The campaign 
The election campaign was well organised 
and went smoothly, despite allegations of 
intimidation by the largest party, Fretilin. In 
the capital, Dili, some prominence was 
given to women's issues: they were evident 
in some media, and the national women 
candidates seemed well-known. However, in 
the countryside, especially beyond the 
reach of the press and radio, awareness was 
much less, and the women candidates were 
little-known. 
Political debate in the run-up to the 
vote frequently referred to the political 
conflicts of 1975 that preceded the 
Indonesian invasion. Some parties - ASDT, 
the Timorese Nationalist Party (PND, and 
~
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Elections 
Parenti! - talked of defending the original 
Democratic Republ ic of East Timar, 
proclaimed by Fretilin on 28 November 
1975, and symbolised by the nat ional flag . 
PNT seemed to have been formed expressly 
to defend this position, and adopted a 
version of the national flag as its emblem. 
For many people, fidelity to the 
independence struggle, and to relatives 
who had died, lay in unquestioning 
allegiance to Freti lin. 
There was widespread fear of a 
recurrence of the violence that characterised 
previous preparations for independence (in 
197 5) and the aftermath of the 1999 
Popular Consultation. In the event, 
however, the elections were 
overwhelmingly peaceful. 
Civic education 
Many organisations devoted considerable 
time and resources to civic and voter 
education. However, CllR's election observer 
mission (in the country from 22 August to 4 
September, see page 4) found that 
awareness of the implications of the vote 
varied considerably, among women as well 
At last, a chance to vote in peace 
as among men. Some people had clearly 
benefitted from civic education 
programmes. One woman in Maubara said 
that democracy was about 'transparency'. 
Other women, especially in villages, 
complained that they did not really know 
anything about the political parties' 
programmes. The mission also discovered 
East Timor's new cabinet 
Marl Bim Amude Alkatiri, 
Fretilin M 
Chief minister and minister of economy and 
development 
Jose Ramos Horta, 
Independent M 
Senior minister for foreign affairs and 
cooperation 
Ana Maria Pessoa Pereira da Silva Pinto, 
Fretilin F 
Minister for justice 
Fernanda Mesquita Borges, 
Independent F 
Minister for finance 
Antoninho Bianco, 
Fretilin M 
Minister for internal administration 
Rui Maria de Araujo, 
Independent M 
Minister for health 
Cesar Vital Moreira, 
Fretilin M 
Minister for water and public works 
Ovldio de Jesus Amaral, 
Fretilin M 
Minister for transport and communications 
f=female m=male 
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Armindo Maia, 
Independent M 
Minister for education, culture and youth 
Estanislau Aleixo da Silva, 
Fretilin M 
Minister for agriculture and fisheries 
Arsenio Paixao Bano, 
Independent M 
Secretary of state for labour and solidarity 
Fernando de Araujo, 
Democratic Party M 
Vice-minister for foreign affairs and 
cooperation 
Jorge da Concei~ao Teme, 
Fretilin M 
Vice-minister for foreign affairs and 
cooperation 
Domingos Maria Sarmento, 
Independent M 
Vice-minister for justice 
Arlinda Rangel da Cruz, 
Fretilin M 
Vice-minister for finance 
Ilda Maria da Concei~o, 
Independent F 
Vice-minister for internal administration 
that few people in the villages seemed to 
understand that the candidates elected to 
the constituent assembly would draft the 
constitution that would set out their rights 
and duties as citizens. The frequency of 
such comments calls into question the UN 
administration's claims of success in the 
voter education campaign. 
Joao Soares Martins, 
Democratic Party M 
Vice-minister for health 
Roque Felix de Jesus Rodrigues, 
Independent M 
Vice-minister for education, culture and 
youth 
Gregorio Jose da Concei~ao Ferreira de 
Sousa, 
Fretilin M 
Secretary of state of the council of ministers 
Egidio Jesus, 
Fretilin 
Secretary of state for natural and mineral 
resources 
Mariano Jose Lopes da Cruz, 
Independent 
Inspector-general 
Emilia Maria Valeria Pires, 
Independent F 
Secretary of the commission on planning 
Isabel da Costa Ferreira, 
Independent F 
Adviser on human rights 
Ant6nio da Concel~o, 
Democratic Party 
Adviser on the development of the 
commission on planning 
Talks with Indonesia 
Putting aside past bitterness 
To ensure the security of its sea and land borders East Timar must negotiate security 
arrangements with Indonesia before the UN administration leaves. On 12 September 
East Timorese leaders met in Jakarta with Indonesian president Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, to discuss a new relationship. Ricardo Tomaz reports on the unresolved 
issues between the two neighbours. 
I n addition to the president, the East Timorese leaders met Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Political and 
Security Affairs, General (retired) Bambang 
Yudhoyono and foreign minister Hassan 
Wirayuda. At the top of the agenda was 
the normalisation of ties and economic 
and trade co-operation. Other matters 
discussed included the refugees stranded 
in West Timor, access to the Oecusse 
enclave, and border delimitation. The two 
sides agreed to hold further talks soon. 
A troubled relationship 
As neighbours, the two countries will have 
to foster some sort of co-operation. This 
meeting aimed to reduce mistrust. The 
East Timorese viewed the appointment of 
Megawati with some apprehension, 
perceiving her as an ultra-nationalist who 
had never shown any understanding for 
East Timor's cause. Nor had they forgotten 
her opposition to the UN-sponsored ballot 
in 1999 and her refusal to meet East 
Timorese resistance leader Xanana 
Gusmao. Only recently, in her 16 August 
'state of the nation' address before the 
legislature, did she acknowledge for the 
first time the 'secession' of East Timor. 
The Indonesian president has failed to 
curb and disband the pro-Indonesian 
militias in East Timor and to bring to 
justice members of her armed forces 
implicated in the violence of September 
1999. 
After taking office, Megawati issued a 
presidential decree expanding the scope of 
an ad hoc tribunal for atrocities 
committed in East Timor. She also called 
on the military to leave politics. But most 
observers saw this as rhetoric intended to 
appease the international community. 
The Indonesian military remains an 
indispensable partner in her coalition. 
Reform is often mentioned, but usually 
resisted. The 'Dual Function' ideology of a 
social and political, as well as security, role 
for the armed forces remains intact. The 
constant ethnic and religious conflicts 
afflicting Indonesia's provinces increase 
the government's dependence on the 
military. One result is continuing 
impunity. The president cannot push for 
the indictment of senior military officers 
because that would endanger her 
government and her own political 
survival. The army had a direct role in the 
fall of the last two presidents, Habibie and 
Wahid - and in the fall of the president's 
father, Sukarno. 
Security 
With independence approaching, the 
newly elected East Timorese authorities 
must establish political, economic and 
social structures to ensure the viability of 
the new state. For this they need stable 
borders and the means to protect their 
territorial and maritime boundaries and 
assets (including the oil and gas resources 
in the Timor Sea). So far, the territory's 
peace and stability has been maintained 
by UN peacekeeping troops, with the East 
Timorese Defence Force deployed 
alongside them. 
The border between East and West 
Timor is poorly demarcated, porous and 
easily crossed by militias. Dili will be 
anxious to see that the Indonesians are 
willing to disarm the militias, who will 
otherwise remain a source of insecurity for 
East Timor. The border also poses the 
problem of illegal migrants and smuggling. 
Another security - problem is the 
enclave of Oecusse, deep inside Indonesian 
West Timor, a legacy of colonial rivalry. It 
could easily become a bone of contention, 
and access agreements will have to be 
cemented and enforced. 
Confidence-building measures and 
military dialogue will be needed between 
the Indonesian military and the new East 
Timorese armed forces. It was recently 
reported that the Indonesian forces 
offered to put aside past grievances and 
train the former guerrilla fighters of East 
Timor. This may well be premature, given 
the history of conflict. Cooperation on 
border security and peace should be the 
first step. 
East Timor's military chief, Taur Matan 
Ruak, recently proposed turning the 
border into a demilitarised zone, to be 
monitored by international observers. 
What price stability? 
The security and stability of an 
independent East Timor will depend to a 
large extent on its relationship with 
Jakarta, and on the political and social 
stability of the Indonesian Republic. It is 
also important that Australia normalises 
political and military ties and re-engages 
with Jakarta. After an Australian-led force 
entered Dili in September 1999, and 
Indonesian forces withdrew humiliated, 
the Indonesian-Australian military 
relationship hit rock bottom. However, 
long-term mutual hostility between the 
two states will threaten and destabilise not 
only East Timor, but the whole region. 
Jose Ramos-Horta recently stated: 'We 
must put aside past bitterness in order to 
normalise ties with our neighbour.' It is to 
be hoped that the East Timorese will not 
attempt to appease Indonesia at all costs. 
Avoiding difficult issues could lead to an 
unequal relationship. Dili's leaders no 
doubt see insistence on an international 
criminal tribunal as politically risky, and 
are balancing this with the need for good 
relations with Indonesia. But 
accommodation could be a heavy price to 
pay for security. 
For the sake of democracy in 
Indonesia, and the memory of the victims 
who died at the hands of the Indonesian 
military, the international community 
must push for the creation of an 
international criminal tribunal for the 
crimes committed in East Timor. 
• Ricardo Tomaz is a student at Middlesex 
University, on placement with CIIR. 
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Success at the polls 
Women candidates secured 24 of the 
88 seats in the constituent assembly, 
more than 26 per cent of the whole. 
How did they do this? And what are 
the implications for the transitional 
government? CllR's joint programme 
manager for Asia, Catherine Scott, 
reports. 
I n August CIIR sent a four-woman election observer team to East Timar to find out to what extent women were 
participating in the election, and how 
they had organised to secure adequate 
representation in the political parties' lists 
of candidates. 
From the end of March, when East 
Timorese women lost a campaign to 
secure a minimum quota of 30 per cent for 
female candidates on party lists, they 
planned carefully. 
With support from Xanana Gusmao, 
the president-in-waiting, and Sergio Vieira 
de Mello, the UN Secretary General's 
special representative in East Timar, the 
UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timar (UNTAET) Gender Affairs Unit was 
asked to organise leadership training 
workshops. Some 600 women were 
trained in May and June. 
UNTAET's Gender Affairs Unit was 
established at the insistence of East 
Timorese women's activists, and five 
international and one local post were 
funded within it. Local women were 
subsequently recruited for training in 
preparation for UNTAET's withdrawal. The 
unit's personnel encounter little 
understanding of gender mainstreaming 
among other sections of UNTAET or 
among East Timor's political leaders. 
Independent candidates 
Women's organisations and REDE, the 
women's network, lobbied the 16 political 
parties to include women candidates high 
on the party lists. REDE also chose three 
women to stand as independent 
candidates at a national level. 
None of the independent women 
candidates was elected. The women's 
organisations could not make up for their 
lack of a party machine. 
Political parties 
The attitudes of the parties were mixed. 
Some placed women candidates in their 
top five. Others excluded women almost 
entirely. The Democratic Party (PD) had 
very few women candidates . Its leaders 
said that this was because the party was 
new, set up in a hurry, and had been 
unable to find sufficient female candidates 
to field. Of the Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) candidates, 28 per cent were 
women, with three in the top 10 listed. 
Thirty-five per cent of Fretilin's candidates 
were women, with four in the top 10 on 
the list. Women accounted for almost half 
(48 per cent) of the Timorese Nationalist 
Party (PNT) candidates. 
Of the 24 women who won seats in 
the election, 18 are from the 
Revolutionary Front for the Independence 
of East Timar (Fretilin), three from the 
PSD, and one each from the PNT, the 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and 
the Socialist Party (PST). 
There was no guarantee that the order 
in the lists would be respected after the 
election. Some parties said that they 
would respect the list, but others, notably 
PNT, did not guarantee this. Alian~a 
Araujo, sister of the party leader, and first 
on the party list, was not sure that she 
would take up her seat. She said it would 
depend on her family duties. She also 
explained that many of the party's women 
candidates would drop out, and hand 
their places down to the next in line: 
Apodeti Pro-Referendum, one of the 
smaller parties, had clearly encountered 
difficulties signing up male candidates at 
all, owing to the party's suspect past (it 
had previously supported union with 
Indonesia). Its leaders frankly admitted 
that this was why they had many female 
candidates. However, none of its 
candidates was elected. 
The Socialist Party leader, Avelino 
Coelo, who had vehemently opposed 
quotas for women when they were 
discussed in East Timor's National Council 
in March, proclaimed his strong support 
of women, and insisted that half of the 
constituent assembly members should be 
women. However he brooked no 
compromise on tactics . Women would 
have to get there on merit, and on popular 
demand, if it took the next four decades. 
Avelino thought that the push for 
women's equal participation in politics 
would have to come more strongly from 
the grassroots if it was to succeed. 
Women's organisations and networks 
CllR met with a number of women's 
organisations and networks, including REDE -
the East Timorese Women's Network, the 
Organisa~ao Mulher Timorense (OMT -
Timorese Women's Organisation), the 
Organisa~ao Popular das Mulheres Timores 
(OPMT - linked to Fretilin), members of the 
East Timorese Women's Caucus, the non-
governmental organisation Fokupers, the East 
Timorese Women's Communications Forum 
and professionals from UNIFEM and UNTAET's 
Gender Affairs Unit. 
OMT was set up in 1974 as a non-party 
political forum for women's concerns, but 
provided practical support to Fretilin's armed 
wing and supported the Council of Timorese 
National Resistance in the 1999 ballot. CllR 
met the group in the town of Baucau. The 
group is a member of REDE. The OMT women 
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were frustrated that information flowed only 
one way, and that news of opportunities and 
resources on offer in Dili did not percolate 
down to the districts. They were also 
concerned that the platform of action agreed 
at the Women's Congress in 2000 was not 
receiving the follow-up it needed. 
OPMT seemed very well organised. Its 
structure mirrors that of the Fretilin party and 
its allegiance is to the party first and to 
women's issues second. Fretilin's women 
candidates will not always be free to support 
progressive changes in favour of women, 
unless these are supported by the party. 
OPMT seemed frustrated at the way posts 
in the Gender Affairs Unit were being 
allocated, and suspected its own cadres had 
been marginalised because of their political 
allegiances. 
REDE, a relatively new umbrella group of 
15 women's organisations, resulted from the 
Women's Congress held in 2000. Despite 
assistance from UNIFEM and international 
NGOs (Oxfam, CllR, etc) it remains weak. A 
significant constraint is that key members of its 
steering committee have too many 
responsibilities. Many have stood for political 
office, others are involved with numerous 
other NGOs. None appear to have the time 
which REDE needs if it is to work effectively. 
Overall, the CllR mission uncovered 
rivalries and frustrations within the East 
Timorese women's movement, which we felt 
detracted from an overall sense of common 
strategy and shared goals. Nevertheless, the 
fact that 24 women have been elected to the 
Constituent Assembly Is big step forward for 
East Tlrnorese women. 
Policies 
When CUR interviewed male political 
leaders about their policies on women, 
few were fully conversant with them, and 
referred us to female party representatives. 
Some seemed to treat the subject as 
something of a joke. We were keen to 
know what they intended to do with the 
UNTAET Gender Affairs Unit. Experience 
elsewhere has shown that unless gender 
affairs is placed in the office of the prime 
minister, and given adequate resources, it 
is usually ineffectual. 
Fretilin, the party that won the 
election, has pledged to place the unit in 
the prime minister's office. Generally, 
Fretilin's policies on women are 
progressive. But what the party will do in 
practice, when budgets are tight and other 
interests at stake, remains to be seen. 
Fretilin's manifesto states that 'for 
centuries, even millennia, women, as mothers, 
have played a key role in the development of 
our younger generation's character and 
personality. Fretilin believes that women share 
the same rights as men; such rights give them 
the capacity to participate more actively in the 
organisation of our society, in political life, 
and in social and economic development. This 
administration will defend the universal 
values of human rights, the rights of women, 
of children, of workers, of the elderly, and of 
the physically handicapped. It will prioritise 
the ratification of existing International 
Conventions on each of the afore-mentioned 
rights.' 
CIIR asked the party's leader, Mari 
Alkatiri, how Fretilin would honour these 
commitments in practice. He said that 
Fretilin would accord the office on the 
status of women a high priority, and 
situate it in the Prime Minister's office. He 
claimed he would form an all-women 
government if he could find enough 
women 'with the capacity' to serve 
(implying that there were few). The 
women candidates fear that female 
Fretilin assembly members will be forced 
to put the party first and women's 
interests second. 
Culture 
Fretilin has also stressed the maintenance 
of traditional family structures. In such a 
traditional and patriarchal society, this 
could be a euphemism for excluding 
women from decision-making. 
The CIIR mission found that 
politicians and voters frequently cited 
culture as a reason why women could not 
or should not participate in politics. It was 
Women 
Women candidates from different parties enter the debate 
also cited to explain the difficulty of 
pressing for women's rights in East Timor. 
Men used it to justify the status quo, as 
did some women. Others railed against it, 
and wondered how it could be changed. 
Older politicians claimed that they 
respected women 'even more than men' 
and that was why women had to be 
protected from unsuitable environments 
such as the world of politics. 
Most seemed to think that it would 
take a long time to effect cultural change. 
However, many women candidates firmly 
believed that recourse to cultural 
relativism could not be tolerated in the 
new East Timor. Cultural change, they felt, 
could be brought about by education. 
Some East Timorese priests have 
criticised women's organisations such as 
Fokupers, which has encouraged women 
to prosecute violent husbands in the law 
courts, rather than rely on traditional 
conflict-resolution methods. Women 
counter that these customs, with their 
compensation rates measured in head of 
cattle or buffalo, reinforce the image of 
women as men's property. 
Women's capacity to take on public 
roles was constantly questioned, by 
women as well as men. When the CUR 
mission broached the idea of women 
standing for office, we were frequently 
told that it would be acceptable provided 
the women had the 'capacity' to stand. 
When asked who is the judge of this 
capacity, and whether men's capacities 
receive the same scrutiny, the answers 
were rather less ready. 
CUR commonly came across the view, 
especially among men but also among 
women, that the only women who could 
participate in politics were single, or had 
no family responsibilities. Nonetheless, 
the women candidates did have 
responsibilities - either children or elderly 
parents - and had come to creative 
arrangements with other family members 
to facilitate their candidacies. Many 
people thought that the 'single' 
candidates would be unable to 
understand the concerns of ordinary 
women voters because of their unusual 
circumstances. 
One woman candidate said that 
people did not see them as wi.lling to serve 
others, but accused them of looking for 
'jobs for the girls' . 
Signing up to women's rights 
A key indicator of women's prospects will 
be whether or not the new government 
signs up to the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. It has 
pledged to do so, and the reporting 
mechanism built into the convention 
provides the opportunity for women. 
Once it has ratified the convention, the 
government will be required to make 
regular reports to the United Nations on 
how it is implementing the treaty. This 
will provide an opportunity for East 
Timorese women's organisations to 
measure progress and lobby for 
improvements at an international level. 
East Timorese women do not deceive 
themselves that equal rights with men will 
be easily won. The 24 newly elected 
women MPs need moral, practical and 
financial support. Getting elected is only 
the beginning of the battle. 
• Read the observer mission's full report on 
www.ciir.org 
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Justice 
International tribunals on trial 
For the past two years CllR and others 
have called for an international 
tribunal to investigate and try 
perpetrators of crimes committed 
during the Indonesian occupation of 
East Timor. Widespread dissatisfaction 
with UN and Indonesian prosecutions 
has led to renewed calls for such a 
court. Jon Cina argues that this may 
not be the best way forward. 
What is an international tribunal? 
An international tribunal is a court of 
judges and prosecution and defence 
lawyers, established in response to crimes 
considered so serious that they are of 
concern to the international community 
as a whole. These courts investigate crimes 
and conduct trials outside national 
judicial systems. The UN Security Council 
may use special powers to create such a 
court, and may grant the resulting 
tribunal legal authority to order countries 
to assist it. The United Nations appoints 
international judges and prosecutors to 
staff the court. 
A more recent variant is for the United 
Nations to enter into an agreement with 
the government of a country to create a 
special court, like those the United 
Nations is negotiating with Sierra Leone 
and Cambodia. Unlike courts created 
directly by the Security Council, these 
institutions include some local judges. 
Why an international tribunal? 
Proponents of an international tribunal 
argue that a court established in the name 
of the world community would have 
greater legitimacy and authority than 
domestic courts in East Timor and 
Indonesia. The tribunal could be given the 
power to order states to provide evidence 
and to hand over accused persons residing 
in their territory. 
An international court is viewed as the 
correct judicial response to the systemic, 
savage and sustained crimes committed in 
East Timor, and to the attack on the UN 
Assistance Mission in East Timor, that 
challenged UN authority. 
The Report of the UN International 
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor 
recommended such a tribunal in January 
2000, but the United Nations favoured a 
dual approach using domestic legal 
systems. Indonesia was urged to 
investigate and prosecute individuals 
6 • Timor Link No.54 January 2002 
under its jurisdiction, while the UN 
Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET) established the Serious Crimes 
Unit (SCU) to conduct parallel 
prosecutions. 
How effective is an international 
tribunal? 
Critics point to the SCU's failure to 
prosecute a single senior perpetrator as a 
sign of its ineffectiveness, believing that 
an international tribunal would enjoy 
greater success. However, the SCU's recent 
indictment of the chief Indonesian 
military and civilian officials stationed in 
Liquica in 1999, all of whom are currently 
sheltered by an uncooperative Indonesian 
state and military, highlights the 
fundamental problem. Obtaining custody 
of the accused depends more on the 
political context in which the court 
operates than on the character of court. 
East Timor's situation is close to that of 
the former Yugoslavia, where some 
countries provided refuge to individuals 
charged with atrocities by the 
international tribunal. Although the 
tribunal's UN mandate enables it to order 
governments to assist it, and an 
independent military force capable of 
arresting suspects exists in the Balkans, it 
was years before intransigent governments 
(of Serbia and Croatia, for example) were 
induced to surrender senior accused. 
Given Indonesia's size and 
importance, it is difficult to see the 
international community applying 
sufficient pressure to make an 
international tribunal more effective. 
Those most culpable for crimes in East 
Timor will continue to enjoy impunity for 
the foreseeable future. 
The experience of other international 
tribunals also suggests that a tribunal for 
East Timor would be limited to a particular 
period of time or set of cases. Delays, 
possibly of years, are likely as interested 
parties negotiate the complex mandate 
and powers, and secure funding and 
competent personnel. Although the courts 
for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have 
established a workable, if limited, system 
of international criminal justice, their 
expense (their combined budgets over 
their short lives total over US$ 700 million) 
and duration (the ex-Yugoslavia tribunal 
expects to continue until 2016) have led 
the international community to pursue 
more limited models of accountability, as 
in Cambodia and Sierra Leone. 
An international tribunal may 
exacerbate existing tensions over who 
should be held accountable and how. It 
will be necessary to decide which cases 
would be heard by an international court, 
how other cases would be tried, and how 
an international tribunal would relate to 
the SCU, domestic courts and the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation (CRTR). 
Are there alternatives? 
All these obstacles can be overcome. 
However, supporters of an international 
tribunal have yet to make a persuasive 
case that an international tribunal is a 
more suitable judicial mechanism in the 
longer term than existing courts. 
Certainly, the Indonesian and UNTAET 
systems are deeply flawed; much of the 
support for an international tribunal is 
based on their perceived failure and the 
assumption that no more can be done to 
improve their efficacy. This may be true 
generally for Indonesia; it is reasonable to 
expect that Jakarta will continue to avoid 
a judicial examination of the role of senior 
officials, or to transfer them to an 
alternative jurisdiction. A reformed SCU, 
on the other hand, could achieve much 
that supporters of an international 
tribunal seek, and could be equally 
effective in tackling non-cooperation. 
A history of weak management, a 
narrow perception of its mandate and 
inadequate political and financial backing 
has left the SCU with little credibility 
among East Timorese or international 
actors. Yet there are good reasons for 
continuing to support it. Acting in 
conjunction with panels of judges (the 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes), it is a 
Security Council-mandated process to 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators. It 
therefore has much of the authority and 
legitimacy that an international court 
would provide. A more creative approach 
could see it using this to increase pressure 
on Indonesia through the United Nations 
and through more vigorous bilateral 
discussions. 
Moreover, the SCU and Special Panels 
are already established in East Timor and 
are required to involve East Timorese fully 
in their work. International tribunals have 
at best a mixed record of engaging 
Justice 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
The path to freedom 
On 28 August 2001 East Timor's Bishop 
Carlos Belo made an appeal for justice 
to the international community. 
The path travelled by new nations is never smooth. Throughout Africa and Asia the people's dreams for 
independence, of the 1960s and '70s, 
remain almost entirely unfulfilled. Those 
dreams were for freedom and the pursuit 
of happiness, but violence, poverty and 
dictatorship too often became the 
reality. [ ... ] 
Two years ago East Timar was burning. 
Two-thirds of the population were fleeing 
for their lives. Militia and army thugs were 
let loose in a deliberate, organised act of 
destruction. Today Dili is thriving. We are 
opening schools and health clinics, 
markets and shops. To a visitor this rapid 
progress appears to be popular and 
widespread. It would be a mistake, 
however, to believe in the permanence of 
these material goods, because this rapid 
growth is only skin deep. Travel beyond 
Dili, or a few of the main towns, and you 
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meaningfully with the communities most 
concerned with their work. 
The potential in the current system 
should therefore be tested before turning 
to alternatives. UNTAET's reform of the 
SCU and related offices makes this 
possible, although further improvements 
are necessary. These should focus on 
recruiting additional prosecutors, 
defenders and investigators; increasing 
participation by East Timorese personnel; 
and putting greater emphasis on crimes 
committed before 1999. Finally, to address 
community concerns about the justice 
system, UNTAET should formally 
undertake a comprehensive public 
education programme about all aspects of 
the accountability process; the SCU and 
Special Panels should also consider sitting 
outside Dili where possible; and commit 
to meaningful consultation with local and 
other interest groups. 
• Jon Cina was, until recently, a Legal 
Adviser to UNTAET's Serious Crimes Unit 
in Dili. He has also documented war 
crimes in Kosovo and worked for three 
years at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
will see no more expensive cars, 
refrigerators or restaurants. Outside the 
main towns life has changed very little. 
Unemployment is high and the young 
people are disillusioned. The inner life of 
the people of East Timar continues to be 
clouded by the events of 1999 as well as 
by doubts about the future. The path to 
independence is not only a material 
phenomenon. It has a spiritual 
dimension. It is as much a product of 
ideas as of things. 
Old habits die hard 
[ ... ] Most new nations find the transition 
to democracy difficult. It will be difficult 
in East Timar as well because we need to 
break down old habits of suspicion and 
coercion in order to allow democracy to 
flourish. It is our dream that we can build 
a society founded on the values enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; they are the values that guided and 
inspired our struggle for independence. 
Democracy needs openness and trust. It 
requires an ability to place our immediate 
needs behind the common good, to open 
our minds to those who might represent a 
larger community than our own family or 
selves. It requires our minds to look 
forward rather than backwards. 
To do that we need to overcome the 
legacy of the past. The international 
community should cast its mind back to 
the 24 years of Indonesian occupation. In 
particular it is important to remember the 
defiance of UN Security Council 
resolutions in 1975 and in 1999, the 
'scorched earth' withdrawal of Indonesian 
troops from East Timar during September 
and October of 1999, as well as the 
organised opposition to the UN ballot. 
Up to 3000 people died in 1999, 
untold numbers of women were raped and 
500,000 people displaced. About 100,000 
are yet to return. Those events live on in 
the minds of Timorese despite the 
material progress of the past two years. 
The survivors of crimes require more than 
material progress. They need justice, and 
only justice will lead to reconciliation. 
Justice cannot be provided simply or 
easily. One thing is certain, however, and 
that is that the future of East Timor 
depends on it. Only through overcoming 
the pain and loss of the past 24 years of 
repression can our country truly walk the 
path to independence. 
Justice for the people of East Timar 
requires that the perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes be identified, and 
prosecuted in the same manner as a 
common criminal. This means a legal 
process is needed. 
[ ... ] Where there are mitigating 
circumstances these need to be kept in 
mind. Some militia members were 
themselves subject to threats against their 
families; some were drugged. 
To date there is no definitive account 
of the crimes committed by the 
Indonesian army and the militias during 
1999. [ ... ] Prosecuting the crimes of 1999 
is essential for East Timar, but also for 
Indonesia. Democracy there is fragile and 
the military continue to intrude on both 
government and civil society. 
Much remains to be done. We call on 
the international community to: 
• Push for an international legal process 
for the generals and top militia leaders 
whose crimes are not only against the 
people of East Timar but against the 
international community itself for 
breaches of international criminal law. 
This requires the international 
community to call them to account 
before an international criminal 
tribunal. 
• Ensure a genuine Indonesian legal 
process that conforms with modern 
legal standards and brings the large 
numbers of military officers directly 
engaged in crimes against humanity in 
East Timar and in Indonesia to 
account.[ ... ] 
• Provide adequate resources and 
expertise to East Timor's own legal 
process to deal with the hundreds of 
militia who remain in the country. 
• Support the recently established Truth, 
Reception and Reconciliation 
Commission in East Timar to enable 
people to overcome the legacy of the 
past and move forward on the path to 
independence. 
[ ... ] Long-term development is just as 
unlikely to occur in East Timar as in the 
other post-colonial nations of Africa and 
Asia, without a comprehensive process 
that enables people to heal and overcome 
the past. 
The path to independence follows the 
road of justice and reconciliation. 
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Refugees 
Repatriation gains 
momentum 
The peaceful conduct of the election 
on 30 August seems to have given 
confidence to the thousands of East 
Timorese in refugee camps in 
Indonesian West Timor. Ricardo Tomaz 
reports. 
The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that in the month of October 2001 more 
than 3,200 refugees returned home from 
West Timar. UNHCR predicts that the 
influx will increase significantly by the 
end of the year. 
An estimated quarter of a million 
people fled into West Timor in the wake of 
the violent aftermath of the 1999 Popular 
Consultation. Pro-Jakarta militias have 
kept a firm grip on the border camps, 
preventing the return of many refugees. 
Independence leader Xanana Gusmao and 
other East Timorese leaders, the Catholic 
Church and UN officials have done their 
utmost to encourage repatriation. 
According to UN sources, since 
October 1999 more than 188,000 refugees 
have returned voluntarily to East Timor. 
However, many remain apprehensive. UN 
agencies estimate that about 60-80,000 
East Timorese remain in the militia-
controlled border camps. 
For Dili, the issue is a top priority. 
Until the border camps are disbanded, the 
militias will remain a security threat and a 
source of tension between Dili and Jakarta. 
The refugee camps are unsanitary and 
have created health problems for their 
residents. There are reports of 
malnutrition, intimidation and domestic 
violence. For the past two years the 
Indonesian government has been 
providing the refugees with 400 grams of 
rice a person a day and a small sum of 
money (Rp 1,500). The militias have 
prevented many refugees from returning. 
Many fear reprisals, political instability 
and violence. Some insist that they will 
return only if granted amnesty. 
East Timorese representatives and 
militia leaders have met several times to 
discuss the problem. Dill has said that all 
refugees are more than welcome to return, 
but any person who is found to have 
committed crimes against humanity 
would face justice. 
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Meanwhile, the deputy commander of 
the anti-independence Mahidi ('Live or 
Die') militia, Cancio Lopes de Carvalho, 
stated that he was ready to face trial for his 
role in the violence of 1999. He said he 
would take responsibility for the actions of 
Mahidi although he had previously denied 
involvement, blaming the Indonesian 
army for inciting violence. He also said 
that he accepted the results of the 1999 
vote and that his struggle was over. 
Unwanted guests 
It is clear that Jakarta wants to close the 
camps as soon as possible: they are a 
financial burden and source of social 
unrest, and they invite international 
criticism. The results of the flawed refugee 
registration process in June this year (see 
Timar Link 53) in which 98 per cent said 
that they wanted to remain in Indonesia, 
alarmed Jakarta. 
At the end of October Indonesia's 
welfare minister Yusuf Kalla stated that by 
31 December the government would halt 
all humanitarian assistance to the refugees 
and disband the camps. It was reported in 
mid-November that the aid supplies had 
indeed dried up. The minister said that the 
refugees must choose between return to 
East Timar or resettlement in Indonesia. 
The refugees said that this was tantamount 
to forcing them to go back to East Timar 
and threatened to cause trouble. 
Reconciliation 
The recent influx of refugees is the 
culmination of several reconciliation 
initiatives and meetings between militia 
leaders and the East Timorese authorities. 
More meetings are planned for the near 
future. Xanana Gusmao has been deeply 
involved in encouraging militia leaders 
and their supporters to return and in 
giving them assurances. He has 
maintained Dili's open door policy to all 
who wish to come home. But while 
repatriation depends on the success of 
reconciliation efforts, reconciliation in 
turn depends on justice. Trials must be 
held for militia members involved in the 
1999 violence. Recently, Prime Minister 
Mari Alkatiri stated that 'without the 
judicial process, reconciliation and 
amnesty would be meaningless'. 
CllR reports 
Report of the CllR Observer 
Mission to East Timor 
Constituent Assembly Election, 
30 August 2001 
In August 2001 CllR sent an all-women 
team to East Timor to look at how East 
Timorese women were participating in the 
election, and preparing for full political 
participation in the life of their new 
country. This report tells what the team 
saw and heard, and presents 
recommendations to enhance women's 
political participation. 
The report can be downloaded from CllR's 
website: www.ciir.org 
East Timor - From Bullet to Ballot 
Report of the CllR observer delegations to 
the Popular Consultation in East Timor, 
1999 
One of the few organisations active on East 
Timor since the Indonesian invasion, CllR 
sent a mission to the territory in 1999 to 
monitor the UN-supervised vote on 
independence. This report summarises the 
mission's findings, highlighting the 
inadequate security arrangements. In doing 
so, it pays tribute to the courage and 
determination of ordinary East Timorese 
people to assert their wish for 
independence, despite extreme intimidation. 
Available from CllR, ISBN 1852872306, 
£4.50 
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